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NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CITIES V. USERY
REVISITED-IS THE QUONDAM
CONSTITUTIONAL MOUNTAIN TURNING OUT
TO BE ONLY A JUDICIAL MOLEHILL?
BERNARD SCHWARTZ*
INTRODUCTION
F EW decisions of the Burger Court appeared more far reaching in
their implications than National League of Cities v. Usery.' In a
single stroke, the Court appeared to revive the doctrine of dual feder-
alism or at least breathe life into the nearly forgotten ghost of state
sovereignty. For the first time since the "constitutional revolution" of
the 1930's, an exercise of congressional power under the commerce
clause was struck down. 2 The Court held that the federal statute at
issue 3 unconstitutionally interfered with the very operation of the
states as independent governments. 4 In addition, the Court relied
upon "traditional aspects of state sovereignty" to invalidate the stat-
ute.5 Thus, the tenth amendment was resurrected as "an express
declaration of [a] limitation" on federal sovereignty.,
Soon after National League of Cities was decided, this author pre-
pared an article analyzing the case's possible impact. 7 Given the time
of the article's writing, however, it was necessarily based entirely
upon pre-National League of Cities jurisprudence and therefore could
contain only general predictions of future judicial application of the
new Supreme Court doctrine. Now, seven years of post-National
League of Cities decisions, including several by the Supreme Court,
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. This
Article is based upon lectures given in April, 1983, at the Fundacion Juan March in
Madrid, Spain.
1. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
2. See id. at 852, 854-55. The most recent such holding was Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936), the last case prior to the Supreme Court's acquies-
cence in New Deal legislation. See Tribe, Unraveling National League of Cities: The
New Federalis'm and Affirmative Rights to Essential Government Services, 90 Harv.
L. Rev. 1065, 1067 & n.9 (1977).
3. Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6
(a)(1), (5), (6), 88 Stat. 55, 58-59 (amending 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (s), (x) (1970)).
4. 426 U.S. at 851.
5. Id. at 849.
6. Id. at 842.
7. Schwartz, National League of Cities v. Usery-The Commerce Power and
State Sovereignty Redivivus, 46 Fordham L. Rev. 1115 (1978).
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permit a more accurate assessment of the impact of National League
of Cities."
The cases since National League of Cities indicate that the reports
of the death of modern federalism were greatly exaggerated. Rather
than restoring the traditional concept of dual federalism, National
League of Cities may prove only an aberration. The first part of this
Article discusses the background of the American system of dual feder-
alism and its metamorphosis into a strong centralized federal govern-
ment. The Article continues with an examination of National League
of Cities and the apparent resurrection of dual federalism. Part II
demonstrates that National League of Cities has done little to revive
dual federalism. The Supreme Court has construed the language of
the case narrowly and has recognized broad exceptions to its holding.
In addition, Congress has circumvented the holding by conditioning
state access to federal funds on compliance with federal policy. The
Article concludes that despite pressure from the White House and the
Court's recognition of state sovereignty in National League of Cities,
the trend toward federal preeminence continues.
I. FROM EARLY AMERICAN FEDERALIsM To NATIONAL
LEAGUE OF CITIES
A. Dual Federalism
During much of its history, the American system of government
was based upon what has been termed dual federalism, premised
upon the notion of "two mutually exclusive, reciprocally limiting
fields of power. ... 9 The federal and state governments co-exist, or
confront one another, as absolute equals with the proper equilibrium
maintained by the strict demarcation of federal and state authority.' 0
This rigid delimitation of their respective lines of authority is thought
necessary to prevent disruption of the union." Thus, under this sys-
tem, the federal government and the states act separately from and
independently of one another within their respective spheres.12 The
tenth amendment provides that while the federal government, in its
8. E.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982);
Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
9. E. Corwin, The Commerce Power versus States Rights 135 (1936); see Da-
meron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322, 326 (1953); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351
(1943); K. Wheare, Federal Government 2 (4th ed. 1964).
10. See E. Corwin, supra note 9, at 135.
11. See Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1869); The Federalist No. 46,
at 296-300 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
12. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124 (1870); E. Corwin, supra note
9, at 135.
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appropriate sphere, may be preeminent, the states possess all the
powers not expressly granted to the federal government.' 3
Through the mid-1930's, the Supreme Court, concerned primarily
with protecting the states from undue encroachments by the federal
government, limited the exercise of federal regulatory authority. 14
The advent of the New Deal, however, tipped the balance toward the
federal government.' 5 Few, if any, economic activities are now con-
sidered beyond the expanded reach of congressional commerce
power.' Thus, federal authority today extends even to areas that were
formerly deemed solely within the competence of the states.' 7 This
development in commerce clause/tenth amendment jurisprudence
seemed to portend the replacement of the federal system by a unitary
government in which the states would be reduced to vestigial -append-
ages of an omnipotent federal government. The Court's decision in
National League of Cities, however, seemed to presage a revival of
dual federalism.
B. National League of Cities
In National League of Cities, the Court considered a challenge to
the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1974 (FLSA Amend-
13. U.S. Const. amend. X; see Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113, 124
(1870); K. Wheare, supra note 9, at 2.
14. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 309-10 (1936) (invalidat-
ing federal law regulating wages and hours of coal miners); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (invalidating federal law prohibiting interstate transporta-
tion of goods produced by child laborers working excessive hours).
15. See, e.g., United States v. South E. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533, 545 (1944)
(local insurance is a business that affects interstate commerce and is within federal
commerce power); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (growing wheat for
primarily family consumption affects interstate commerce and is subject to federal
regulation); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 117 (1941) (production for inter-
state commerce includes goods that may, but actually do not, enter interstate com-
merce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 31 (1937) (union-
management relations affect interstate commerce).
16. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154-55 (1971) (local loan-
sharking); North Am. Co. v. SEC, 327 U.S. 686, 705 (1946) (public utilities);
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127 (1942) (small farmers).
17. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301-04 (1964).(small restaurant
with out-of-state suppliers affects interstate commerce and is subject to federal
regulation); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964)
(small motel serving travelers affects interstate commerce and is subject to federal
regulation). Compare Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) (federal law
prohibiting transportation in interstate commerce of goods produced with child labor
held unconstitutional) with United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 116-17 (1941)
(federal law prohibiting shipment of goods produced in violation of Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 upheld).
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ments),18 which extended federal minimum wage and maximum hour
requirements to most state and local government employees.' The
Court ruled that Congress could not impose the requirements of the
FLSA Amendments on states. 20 Although the Court recognized that
the conditions of employment of private sector employees are not
beyond the scope of the federal commerce power, a sharp distinction
was drawn between congressional regulation of private businesses21
and regulation "directed ... to the states as states. '2 2 When Congress
attempts direct regulation of the states as states, and also impairs the
integral operations of traditional state functions, the tenth amend-
ment sets limits "upon the power of Congress to override state sover-
eignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary powers to tax or to
regulate commerce. ' '1 3
In a 1983 decision,2 4 the Court discussed the rationale behind Na-
tional League of Cities. The Court stated "that the imposition of
certain federal regulations on state governments might, if left un-
checked, 'allow "the National Government [to] devour the essentials
of state sovereignty."' "25 The tenth amendment embodies an affirm-
ative limitation on the exercise of congressional power under the
commerce clause much like other affirmative limitations on commerce
power.2 6 Congress, therefore, may not exercise its commerce power in
a manner that may impair the states' ability to function effectively as
separate and independent entities.
II. BEYOND NATIONAL LEAGUE OF CrrmEs
The Court recently established a framework within which to deter-
mine whether tenth amendment limitations on federal power should
apply:
[I]n order to succeed, a claim that congressional commerce power
legislation is invalid under the reasoning of National League of
Cities must satisfy each of three requirements. First, there must be
a showing that the challenged statute regulates the "States as
States.". . . Second, the federal regulation must address matters
18. Pub. L. No. 93-259, § 6(a)(1), (5), (6), 88 Stat. 55, 58-59 (amending 29
U.S.C. § 203(d), (s), (x) (1970)).
19. 426 U.S. 833, 838-41 (1976).
20. Id. at 852.
21. Id. at 840-41.
22. Id. at 845.
23. Id. at 842.
24. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
25. Id. at 1060 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 855
(1976) (quoting Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 205 (1968))).
26. Id.; National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 841 (1976) (right to
jury trial and due process limit commerce clause).
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that are indisputably "attribute[s] of state sovereignty.". . . And
third, it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the
federal law would directly impair their ability "to structure inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions."27
The first and third prongs of this test have been the focus of recent
Supreme Court analysis of the scope of the tenth amendment.2 8 The
Court has "had little occasion to amplify on [the] understanding of
the" second prong.291 The impact of National League of Cities has been
substantially diminished by the Court's strict interpretation of the first
and third prong requirements. In addition, exceptions to the applica-
tion of the National League of Cities doctrine have been delineated to
protect overriding federal interests.30 Moreover, Congress has circum-
vented the possible impact of the test's application through artful use
of the legislature's power of the purse.31
A. The Three-Prong Test
1. The First Prong
Under the first prong of the test, a federal law must regulate "states
as states" to come within the purview of National League of Cities.3 2
In the 1981 case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Association,3 3 the Court determined that a federal law establishing
mandatory minimum federal standards for surface mining operations
did not regulate the states as states.3 4 In upholding the federal statute,
the Court did not look at the effect of the statute on the state regula-
tory agency, but rather focused upon the underlying "activities actu-
ally regulated by the [statute] ."3 If the underlying activity is carried
out by a private entity and affects commerce, the federal government
has the authority to preempt state law pursuant to its commerce
27. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287-88
(1981) (emphasis in original) (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S.
833, 845, 852, 854 (1976)); accord EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 (1983);
United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982).
28. See EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1062-64 (1983) (third prong);
FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 758-70 (1982) (first prong); United Transp.
Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982) (third prong); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 286 (1981) (first prong).
29. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 n.11 (1983).
30. See infra notes 91-109 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 120-48 and accompanying text.
32. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 (1983); United Transp. Union v.
Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 684 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 287 (1981).
33. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
34. Id. at 288.
35. Id. at 289.
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clause power.3 The state remains free, however, to promulgate con-
current, nonconflicting legislation.37 For example, under the statute,
the state could enact surface mining regulations that were stricter
than the federal standards.3 8 Such a statute, according to the Court,
exemplifies a "program of cooperative federalism" that permits states,
within federal limits, to pursue their own policy goals. 3 Thus, a
federal law that establishes strict minimum standards does not consti-
tute regulation of a "state as a state."
In FERC v. Mississippi,40 the Court, without explicitly utilizing the
three-prong test, applied the Hodel preemption analysis. 41 The Su-
preme Court considered the constitutionality of the Public Utility
36. See id. at 289-90; FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 764 (1982). Justice
O'Connor, in her partial dissent in FERC, disagreed with the majority's preemption
analysis. She stated that "[u]nder the Court's analysis, for example, National League
of Cities v. Usery ... would have been wrongly decided, because the States could
have avoided the Fair Labor Standards Act by 'choosing' to fire all employees subject
to that Act and to close those branches of state government." Id. at 781-82 (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (citation omitted). Thus, the choice of
ceasing regulation in an area of parallel federal regulation enables a state to avoid
that federal regulation. Therefore, federal regulation of the area would not be
limited by the tenth amendment under the preemption analysis. Justice O'Connor
further stated that although the federal statute's purpose was to regulate private
utility companies, its commands were addressed solely to the States, "[making it]
difficult to argue that [it] is not a regulation of the 'State.' " Id. at 779.
Justice O'Connor may be misinterpreting the majority's analysis. The Court pro-
vided some guidance regarding the scope of preemption analysis when it stated that
"[w]e hold only that Congress may impose conditions on the State's regulation of
private conduct in a pre-emptible area." Id. at 769-70 n.32. The holding "does not
suggest that the Federal Government may impose conditions on state activities in
fields that are not pre-emptible, or that are solely of intrastate concern. And it does
not purport to authorize the imposition of general affirmative obligations on the
States." Id. at 770 n.32. The majority attempted to prevent the inference of the
overruling of National League of Cities by stating that the holding "does not foreclose
a Tenth Amendment challenge to federal interference with the State's ability 'to
structure employer-employee relationships.' "Id. The Court will apparently be able
to distinguish between statutes that interfere with this relationship and those that are
legitimate exercises of federal power. Justice O'Connor, however, is apparently
skeptical of the Court's ability to make this distinction. See id. at 782 n.9 (O'Connor,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("The Court... does not explain why our
National League of Cities opinion did not consider compliance with the Fair Labor
Standards Act in fields such as 'licensing of occupations and businesses, . . . preserva-
tion of environmental quality, . . . [and] protection of the public against fraud and
sharp practice,' a 'conditio[n] on the State's regulation of private conduct in a pre-
emptible area.' ") (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 769 n.32 (1982) and
Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant, app. 1, at 16, National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (reprint of complaint)).
37. 452 U.S. at 289.
38. See id.
39. Id.
40. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
41. Id. at 759, 764-67.
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Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA) 2-a federal law that re-
quires state agencies to implement national public utility regulatory
programs. The state, as part of the implemention of these programs, is
required to resolve disputes arising under the federal statute.43 In
addition, under PURPA, state agencies that regulate electric utilities
must conduct administrative proceedings to consider and determine
whether national rate design policies and service standards should be
adopted and enforced with respect to each regulated electric utility. 44
The Court upheld the dispute resolution provisions based upon the
"constitutional command" that the federal policy underlying PURPA
is the prevailing policy in every state and thus the state regulatory
agency must enforce this policy. 45 In addition, the federal commerce
power was invoked to support the mandatory consideration of federal
standards by the states. 46 The Court noted that the federal govern-
ment has unquestioned authority to regulate private utilities and may
preempt the state entirely in this area of regulation.47 Thus, PURPA
does not infringe upon state sovereignty simply because state partici-
pation in regulation is conditioned upon consideration of federal stan-
dards. 48
In the more recent case of EEOC v. Wyoming,49 the Court again
had occasion to apply the first prong of the test.50 In contrast to
Hodel, however, the Court ruled that the federal statute regulated the
state as a state. The federal law directed the state not to retire its game
wardens at age fifty-five. 51 The facts were akin to those in National
League of Cities in which the challenged federal law directed the state
to pay its employees a minimum wage and imposed a maximum hour
requirement.52 Thus, unless a federal law regulates states as states, for
example in their role as public employers, the law will not come under
the restrictions of National League of Cities.
The Court has recognized that this first prong marks National
League of Cities as a "specialized immunity doctrine rather than a
broad limitation on federal authority."' 53 Additionally, judicial inter-
42. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, 2601-2645 (1982).
43. 456 U.S. at 760; 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(f)(1) (1982); 18 C.F.R. § 292.401(a)
(1983).
44. 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (1982).
45. 456 U.S. at 760 (quoting Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 393 (1947)).
46. Id. at 761-67.
47. Id. at 764.
48. Id. at 765.
49. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
50. Id. at 1061.
51. See id. at 1059, 1064.
52. See National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 839 (1976).
53. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1061 n.10 (1983).
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pretation of the third prong has further restricted the impact of Na-
tional League of Cities.
2. The Third Prong
a. Traditional State Functions: United Transportation Union v. Long
Island Rail Road
The statute at issue in National League of Cities was held unconsti-
tutional because it displaced state policies regarding the manner in
which the delivery of governmental services, such as police and fire
protection, would be structured.5 4 The challenged amendments thus
abridged the states' freedom to structure "integral operations in areas
of traditional governmental functions." 55
All federal interference with state operations, however, does not
necessarily interfere with "traditional state functions." Under the
commerce clause, Congress may regulate a state that is engaged in
non-traditional state functions. 56 In the 1936 case of United States v.
California,57 for example, the Court held that a state-run freight
railroad was subject to federal safety regulations.5 While the activity
was within the reserved powers of the state, it was an activity "com-
monly carried on by private enterprise." 59 The Court in National
League of Cities distinguished United States v. California on the
ground that the FLSA Amendments interfered with a traditional state
function-the allocation of state resources.60
This distinction was also the basis for upholding a federal statute in
the post-National League of Cities decision of United Transportation
Union v. Long Island Rail Road."' The Long Island Rail Road is a
passenger line owned and operated by New York State. During a 1979
labor dispute, the pertinent federal and state laws conflicted. The
state law prohibited strikes by public employees. 2 Federal law, 3
however, permitted railroad employees to strike after mediation ef-
54. 426 U.S. at 851.
55. Id. at 852.
56. See United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 686 (1982);
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 422-24 (1978)
(Burger, C.J., concurring); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 182 (1936).
57. 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
58. Id. at 177.
59. Puget Sound Power & Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619, 624 (1934); see
United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 183 (1936) (citing Puget Sound Power &
Light Co. v. Seattle, 291 U.S. 619 (1934)).
60. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.18 (1976).
61. 455 U.S. 678, 685 (1982).
62. Taylor Law, N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law § 210 (McKinney 1983).
63. The Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1976).
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forts failed. 4 When negotiation and mediation efforts did fail, the
union sued for a declaratory judgment that the labor dispute was
governed by the federal law.
In Long Island Rail Road, the key issue was "whether [the] federal
law impair[ed the] state's authority with respect to 'areas of tradi-
tional [state] functions.' "85 The Court concluded that it did not,
because in the United States, operation of railroads "has traditionally
been a function of private industry, not state or local governments." 66
The fact "that some . . . railroads have come under state control in
recent years. . . does not alter the historical reality that the operation
of railroads is not among the functions traditionally performed by
state and local governments. Federal regulation of state-owned rail-
roads simply does not impair a State's ability to function as a State. '8 7
States cannot, "by acquiring functions previously performed by the
private sector, erode federal authority in areas traditionally subject to
federal statutory regulation." 6 Thus, National League of Cities has
not altered the interpretation of "traditional state functions." The
tenth amendment does not immunize the states from federal regula-
tion of functions not historically performed by state governments.
b. Impairment of Integral State Operations: EEOC v. Wyoming
In EEOC v. Wyoming,69 the Supreme Court indicated that the
tenth amendment does not restrict the application of federal law
when the the federal regulation does not "directly impair [state] abil-
ity 'to structure integral operations in areas of traditional func-
tions.' ",70 In this case, the Court considered the constitutionality of
amendments to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) .71 The ADEA prohibits employment discrimination because
of age by states against workers between the ages of forty and sev-
enty,72 except when age is a "bona fide occupational qualification" for
a given job.73 In 1974, Congress extended the ADEA to states acting as
64. United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678, 680-81 (1982); see
Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369, 380
(1969).
65. 455 U.S. at 684.
66. Id. at 686.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 687.
69. 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983).
70. Id. at 1069 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n,
452 U.S. 264, 287-88 (1981)).
71. Age Discrimination in Employment Act Amendments of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-256, 92 Stat. 189 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 631(b), 633a (Supp. V 1981)); Fair
Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55 (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 630(b) (1976)).
72. 29 U.S.C. § 631(a) (Supp. V 1981).
73. Id. § 623(f)(1) (1976).
1983]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
employers.74 Wyoming law, however, required game wardens to re-
tire at age fifty-five. 75 The state claimed that the federal law violated
the principle of state sovereignty laid down in National League of
Cities. The Supreme Court disagreed, upholding the extension of the
federal statute.76
The Court conceded that "management of state parks is clearly a
traditional state function. '77 Nonetheless, the Court found that the
ADEA, in contrast to the FLSA, did not impair the integral operation
of this function. 78 In National League of Cities, the federal law had a
substantial financial effect because it forced the states to pay their
workers a minimum wage and an overtime rate that would leave
those states with less money for other state programs. 79 In EEOC v.
Wyoming, on the other hand, there was no such effect. The state
could continue to pay its workers exactly the same rate it would have
paid without the federal statute.80 In addition, the state could con-
tinue to assess the fitness of its game wardens and dismiss those found
unfit. Indeed, the federal law permits a state to continue its employ-
ment practice if it "can demonstrate that age is a 'bona fide occupa-
tional qualification' for the job of game warden."81 The Court con-
cluded "that the degree of federal intrusion in this case is sufficiently
less serious than it was in National League of Cities so as to make it
unnecessary for us to override Congress' express choice to extend its
regulatory authority to the States. 81 2
The Court, as pointed out in a strong dissent by Chief Justice
Burger, neglected to address the actual costs of the FLSA Amend-
ments . 3 Like the law in National League of Cities, "the statute can
give rise to increased employment costs caused by forced employment
of older individuals. 8 4 Older workers are at the upper end of the pay
scale, their pension and health insurance costs are higher, and disabil-
ity costs may be involved.8 5
There are other costs as well. Under the rubric of non-economic
hardships, the state as employer is "prevented from hiring those physi-
74. Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 55
(codified at 29 U.S.C. § 630(b), (f) (1976)).
75. Wyo. Stat. § 31-3-107 (1977).
76. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 (1983).
77. Id. at 1062.
78. Id.
79. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 850-51 (1976).
80. 103 S. Ct. at 1062-63.
81. Id. at 1062 (quoting ADEA, 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (1976)).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1068-75 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 1070.
85. Id.
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cally best able to do the job." 88 Further, older workers inevitably
"occupy a disproportionate share of the upper-level and supervisory
positions.18 7 A bar on mandatory retirement therefore also impedes
promotion opportunities. The absence of "such opportunities tends to
undermine younger employees' incentive to strive for excellence, and
impedes the state from fulfilling affirmative action objectives."88
From this point of view, the federal age requirement has an impact
upon the state's ability to structure and operate its civil service similar
to that of the wage and hour requirements invalidated in National
League of Cities. Recognizing this incongruity, Chief Justice Burger
stated that he found it "impossible to say that [the bona fide occupa-
tional qualification exception to the ADEA] provides an adequate
method for avoiding significant impairment to the state's ability to
structure its integral governmental operations."' 9
Even if the majority is correct in its attempt to distinguish the
ADEA from the statute invalidated in National League of Cities, the
Court can hardly deny that EEOC v. Wyoming subjects the states to
federal power in a manner that belies the notion of state equality with
the federal government. The Court's strict interpretation of "tradi-
tional state function" and "integral state operations" tends to vitiate
the efficacy of National League of Cities. States can no longer confi-
dently rely on the decision to defend noncompliance with federal law.
Moreover, even if the three-prong test is satisfied, state sovereignty
may still be supplanted by overriding federal interests. 90
B. Overriding Federal Interests: Civil Rights and
Environmental Protection
Over a century ago, in Kentucky v. Dennison,9' the Supreme Court
declared that Congress "has no power to impose on a State officer, as
such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it."' 92 In FERC
v. Mississippi,9 3 the Court referred to this now-famous statement, but
went on to say that "[r]ecent cases, however, demonstrate that this
...is not representative of the law today. 9 4 FERC thus implies that
the state and federal government may no longer "be viewed as coe-
86. Id. at 1071.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1072.
90. Id. at 1061 (majority opinion); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R.,
455 U.S. 678, 684 n.9 (1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation
Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981).
91. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
92. Id. at 107.
93. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
94. Id. at 761.
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qual sovereigns" in all situations. 5 Rather, the national government
has the power to control areas of activity that, half a century ago,
were considered within the reserved powers of the states.
The Supreme Court has determined that certain rights warrant a
preferred status under the Constitution. In the area of civil rights, for
example, the Court has granted Congress broad discretion to protect
individual liberty interests.96 In addition, the Court has carved out an
exception to the general rule against intrusion into integral state oper-
ations when constitutionally protected civil rights are jeopardized by
state action. When Congress properly exercises its power to protect
civil rights, it is not limited by the same tenth amendment constraints
that restrict the exercise of its commerce clause powers.9 7 Thus, the
Supreme Court has indicated that National League of Cities does not
limit the power of Congress to enforce the constitutional guaranty of
racial equality in elections through regulation of state voting prac-
tices.98 Similarly, congressional authority to protect other constitu-
tional rights against state violations is free from tenth amendment
restraints. 99
The principle has been applied in cases involving Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 100 which prohibits discrimination in employ-
ment on the grounds of race, color, sex, religion, or national origin. 101
In 1972, Congress amended the Civil Rights Act to include states as
"persons" subject to the prohibition. 10 2 Federal courts, concluding
that Congress has the power to apply the same standard to both
private employers and states as employers, have had no difficulty
upholding this provision. 103 For example, the Ninth Circuit recently
held that "National League of Cities does not apply because the Tenth
Amendment only limits laws passed pursuant to the Commerce
95. Id.
96. See City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 179 (1980); South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 325 (1966).
97. EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054, 1064 n.18 (1983); see City of Rome v.
United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-79 (1980).
98. City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 (1980); see Note,
Eradicating Racial Discrimination in Voter Registration: Rights and Remedies Under
the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, 52 Fordham L. Rev. 93, 128-29 (1983).
99. See Monnel v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 690 n.54 (1978)
(sexual equality in public employment); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 291
(1977) (racial equality in education).
100. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
101. Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
102. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(1), 86
Stat. 103, 103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(a) (1976 & Supp. V 1981)).
103. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976); Harris v. Pennsyl-
vania, 419 F. Supp. 10, 12-13 (M.D. Pa. 1976).
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Clause." 10 4 The national interest in enforcing laws against discrimina-
tion outweighs whatever intrusion on state sovereignty may be in-
volved.10 5 Even in cases to which National League of Cities applies,
the federalism argument cannot be used to prevent congressional
action to enforce the fourteenth amendment. 06
This exception to National League of Cities is not limited to the
protection of civil rights. The Court has determined that other inter-
ests may also warrant interposition of federal law. For example,
courts have accorded environmental protection a preferred status in
relation to the tenth amendment. The Sixth Circuit upheld the power
of Congress to prohibit a state from granting motor vehicle licenses to
vehicles that fail to comply with federal air pollution standards.' 07
The court determined that the "federal interest in controlling air
pollution far outweighs any state interest in permitting non-comply-
ing vehicles to use public streets and highways."'' 08 This holding bears
out Justice Blackmun's statement in his concurring opinion in Na-
tional League of Cities that the tenth amendment "does not outlaw
federal power in areas such as environmental protection, where the
federal interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility com-
pliance with imposed federal standards would be essential."'09
104. Norris v. Arizona Governing Comm. for Tax Deferred Compensation Plans,
671 F.2d 330, 336 (9th Cir. 1982) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part, rev'd in part
on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 3492 (1983); see also United States v. Virginia, 620 F.2d
1018, 1023 (4th Cir.) (Congress has authority to apply fair employment law to state
and local governments to enforce equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1021 (1980).
105. See Scott v. City of Anniston, 597 F.2d 897, 900 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied,
446 U.S. 917 (1980); cf. Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 552 F.2d 25, 37-39 (2d Cir.)
(federal interest in national health and clean air outweighs intrusion into state
sovereignty), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 902 (1977).
106. In United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), the
Court restated the three-prong test to be applied in evaluating claims under National
League of Cities. Id. at 684. The Court went on to say, in a footnote: "However,
even if these three requirements are met, the federal statute is not automatically
unconstitutional under the Tenth Amendment. The federal interest may still be so
great as to 'justif[y] State submission.' " Id. at 684 n.9 (quoting Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 n.29 (1981)).
107. United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981); see also Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d
246 (3d Cir. 1974) (upholding Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970). But see Brown v.
EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 839-40 (9th Cir. 1975) (invalidating Clean Air Act Amendments
of 1970), vacated, 431 U.S. 99 (1976).
108. United States v. Ohio Dep't of Highway Safety, 635 F.2d 1195, 1205 (6th
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 949 (1981).
109. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring).
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
C. Federal Highway Regulation
In contrast to state laws affecting civil rights and the environment,
state regulation of trucking traditionally has been accorded a pre-
ferred position in relation to federal commerce power." 0 In the ab-
sence of conflicting federal regulation, a state law relating to highway
safety will not neccesarily be invalidated under the commerce
clause."' If the state has a proven and substantial safety interest, the
state law will survive a commerce clause attack." 2
In the presence of a conflicting federal law, however, the safety
rationale has not been sufficient to invoke the tenth amendment limi-
tation on federal commerce power. For example, in January 1983,
Congress enacted a law forbidding states from prohibiting tandem
trucks from using major state roads." 3 Despite the federal statute,
Connecticut passed just such a law four months later." 4 The federal
government brought an action for a preliminary injunction to stop the
state from enforcing its law." 5 The federal district court in Connecti-
cut agreed to issue the injunction in spite of the state's admittedly
substantial safety interests." 6 The court held that only Congress can
decide that the federal law's effects warrant its repeal. 117 The court
refused to invoke the tenth amendment, stating that "[a]n assertion
that a Federal statute may have some deleterious effect upon the
110. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 675 (1981) (plural-
ity opinion); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 444 n.18 (1978).
111. See Maurer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598, 617 (1940); South Carolina State
Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938). But see Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (state highway safety regulation burden-
ing interstate commerce invalidated).
112. See Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 669-75 (1981)
(plurality opinion) (state did not support safety rationale, regulation invalid); Bibb v.
Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 529-30 (1959) (state regulation unduly burden-
ing interstate commerce invalidated); South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189 (1938) (safety regulation upheld).
113. Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-424, §§ 133,
411, 96 Stat. 2097, 2123-24, 2159-60 (current version at 23 U.S.C.A. § 127 (West
Supp. 1983); 49 U.S.C.A. § 2311 (West Supp. 1983)). Such trucks have been called
"killer trucks," because of the number of fatal accidents in which they have been
involved, as well as the extensive highway damage they have caused. Indeed, accord-
ing to a 1982 U.S. Department of Transportation study, such trucks do "at least 87
times as much damage to the pavement as the heaviest auto." N.Y. Times, Feb. 4,
1983, at A27, col. 2.
114. An Act Concerning Tandem Trailer Trucks, Pub. Act No. 83-21, 1983 Conn.
Legis. Serv. 55 (West). The Governor specifically ordered police to enforce the ban
"because Connecticut has a legitimate interest in protecting the safety of travelers on
Connecticut's highways." N.Y. Times, May 20, 1983, at B5, col. 1.
115. 566 F. Supp. 571 (D. Conn. 1983), affd mem., No. 83-6159 (2d Cir. Sept. 1,
1983), af-f'd mem., 52 U.S.L.W. 3610 (U.S. Feb. 21, 1984).
116. Id. at 578.
117. Id.
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people of a state does not amount to an adequate claim that the
Federal statute violates the Tenth Amendment." 8
A state seeking to regulate trucks has a greater burden when it is
acting in the face of competing congressional legislation than when
Congress has not spoken." 9 Thus, even after National League of
Cities, rationales that have traditionally supported state law in areas
where there are no contradictory federal regulations are not sufficient
to uphold the state law in the presence of a contradictory federal
statute.
D. Spending Power
It has been suggested that Congress may use its spending power to
achieve what it cannot achieve under the commerce clause-state
compliance with federal policy. 120 The 1947 case of Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Commission'2 ' demonstrates the extent to which Congress can
attach conditions to funds granted to the states. The case involved a
challenge to the Hatch Act, 2 2 which was designed to prevent public
employees from engaging in political activities. The principles of
federalism underlying National League of Cities preclude a direct
congressional prohibition of political activities by state employees. In
Oklahoma v. Civil Service Commission,2 3 however, Congress was
able to attain the same result by conditioning federal grants on state
enactment of legislation prohibiting such participation.124
Several lower federal courts have concluded that National League
of Cities does not affect the reasoning of Oklahoma v. Civil Service
Commission. 25 In New Hampshire Department of Employment Se-
curity v. Marshall, 1 26 for example, the court sustained the requirement
that there be a program providing unemployment compensation ben-
118. Id.
119. Id. at 575 n.6.
120. See, e.g., La Pierre, The Political Safeguards of Federalism Redux: Intergov-
ernmental Immunity and the States as Agents of the Nation, 60 Wash. U.L.Q. 779,
823-65 (1982); Schwartz, supra note 7, at 1129-32.
121. 330 U.S. 127 (1947). The Court consistently sustains federal statutes that
attach conditions to state receipt of federal funds. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam) (upholding provisions of Federal Election Campaign Act
of 1971); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (upholding Federal
Unemployment Tax Act).
122. An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Pub. L. No. 76-252, 53 Stat.
1147 (1939) (amended by An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, Pub. L.
No. 76-753, § 12(b), 54 Stat. 768 (1940)).
123. 330 U.S. at 143-44.
124. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 631 F.2d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir.)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980); New Hampshire Dep't of Employ-
ment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 248-49 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S.
806 (1980).
126. 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
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efits to most state employees as a condition of federal approval of state
unemployment compensation programs. 2 7 Under the Federal Unem-
ployment Tax Act (FUTA),128 federal approval is required before such
state programs can receive certain federal grants. In addition, federal
approval is a precondition to exemption of private employers from
both federal and state unemployment taxes.129
The effect of the 1976 federal unemployment compensation law
upon the states is similar to that of the statute held invalid in National
League of Cities. Both laws control states in their capacity as employ-
ers and increase the costs of employment for states. 30 Nonetheless,
federal courts have upheld the enforcement of the 1976 statute under
Congress' spending power.' 31 Courts distinguish between voluntary
compliance with the unemployment compensation requirement and
the mandatory controls on states involved in National League of
Cities.132 Courts stress that the unemployment compensation law does
not set wage rates or affect hours worked, and, as a result, FUTA does
not impermissibly interfere with state employment schemes. 33 Thus,
the holding of National League of Cities is limited to statutes that
mandate "local compliance with a discretion-less federal enact-
ment." 134 Federal laws based on the spending power do not fall into
this category because they give states the choice of conforming to the
federal requirements or refusing to participate.
This choice, however, is illusory. For example, every state except
New Hampshire immediately conformed to the 1976 federal statute
and enacted laws providing unemployment compensation coverage
for public employees. 35 Even New Hampshire, after initiating a chal-
lenge to the statute, enacted a law conforming to the federal stat-
127. Id. at 246.
128. 26 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3311 (1976).
129. Id. §§ 3304(a)(6)(b), 3309(a)(2).
130. See New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240,
246 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
131. Id. at 247, 249.
132. See County of Los Angeles v. Marshall, 631 F.2d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980); New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec. v Marshall,
616 F.2d 240, 245-47 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980); cf. Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981) (state has
choice to enact or enforce federal mining standards; if they do not, federal govern-
ment will administer standards).
133. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment See. v Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 248-49
(1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980); see County of Los Angeles v.
Marshall, 631 F.2d 767, 769 (D.C. Cir.) (court adopts reasoning of New Hampshire
Dep't of Employment Sec. v. Marshall), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
134. Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025, 1030 (D.D.C.
1978), aff'd mem., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
135. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment See. v Marshall, 616 F.2d 240, 246
n.7 (1st Cir.), appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980).
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ute.' 38 The New Hampshire legislature, however, expressly stated that
it was acting only to avoid the onerous cost of noncompliance to the
state's businesses. 1 37
Other post-National League of Cities cases involving use of the
federal spending power have arisen under the National Flood Insur-
ance Program. 138 The program provides that all grants of federal
funds for "acquisition or construction purposes" in an area with spe-
cial flood hazards are conditioned on community participation in the
federal program.' 3 This requirement is met by state enactment of
land use control measures that meet federal standards for minimizing
flood damage.' 40 If a community refuses to enact the required mea-
sures, the landowners in the area are denied important federal finan-
cial assistance, including federally subsidized mortgage loans and fed-
eral disaster relief assistance.' 4'
In Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris, 142 the district
court interpreted National League of Cities as prohibiting the federal
government from directly ordering the states to enact laws regulating
land use. 43 The court, however, ruled that such regulation may be
achieved indirectly by conditioning receipt of federal funds on state
compliance with federal policy. 144 In order to receive funds, states and
localities must exercise their legislative powers to enact land use con-
trol laws that meet federal standards. Moreover, the court ruled that
states could be required to bear the costs of enforcing those laws. Once
again federal "coercion" through the spending power was upheld. In
upholding the National Flood Insurance Program, the court viewed
136. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 282-A (1981).
137. According to the legislature, the loss of offset credits "against taxes imposed
by the Federal Unemployment Tax Act which would amount to in excess of 40
million dollars, [is] a price which is totally disproportionate to the cost of benefits to
governmental employees." 1979 N.H. Laws 359; La Pierre, supra note 120, at 832
n.210.
138. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976); e.g., Texas Landowners Rights Ass'n v.
Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mere., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979); North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.
Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mem., 435 U.S. 962 (1978). The statute's purposes
include inducing the states to adopt land use control measures that will reduce
damage from floods, 42 U.S.C. § 4001(e) (1976), and encouraging property owners
in areas that are susceptible to floods to purchase flood insurance, id. § 4001(a) (4).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 4003(a)(4) (1976).
140. Id. §§ 4012(c), 4012a. The federal standards restrict development in flood-
prone areas, require flood-proof construction, and require land-use planning to avoid
flood damage. Id. § 4102.
141. Id. § 4012a; see La Pierre, supra note 120, at 835-36.
142. 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff'd mein., 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979).
143. Id. at 1029-30; see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4012(c), 4012a (1976).
144. 453 F. Supp. at 1030.
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the law merely as a "carrot and a stick" scheme that offered "certain
inducements for state participation.' ' 145 The states had a choice
whether to participate in the program-a choice that would be based
upon "the potential local benefits of flood insurance against the costs
of participation to local sovereignty and pocketbooks.' 146
Here, too, the choice is virtually nonexistent. 147 A state's refusal to
adopt the land-use controls will render property owners in flood-
prone areas ineligible for federal financial assistance. In practice, no
state has chosen to reject the federal financial benefits associated with
compliance. 48 If Congress can so easily affect integral functions of
state governments, National League of Cities becomes an easily sur-
mountable barrier to congressional encroachments upon state opera-
tions.
III. "NEw FEDEALISM"
The shifting balance of power brought about by the decline of dual
federalism was customarily characterized as the "new federalism.' 4
The outstanding feature of this "new federalism" was the growth of
federal power, notably through the power of the purse exercised
through conditional grants-in-aid to the states.'5 0 The recent expan-
sion of federal authority has led to calls for still another "new federal-
ism"-this time to reverse the centripetal trend. 51 In particular, there
have been calls to reduce state dependence on federal grants, or at a
minimum to remove some of the conditions that must be met before
federal funds are granted. 52
[P]robably no one can say today how much state and local tax
revenue-the lifeblood of local autonomy-is committed to pro-
grams the standards for which are set and controlled under federal
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. See La Pierre, supra note 120, at 838.
148. See Comment, Toward New Safeguards on Conditional Spending: Implica-
tions of National League of Cities v. Usery, 26 Am. U.L. Rev. 726, 759 n.192 (1977);
see also Holmes, Federal Participation in Land Use Decisionmaking at the Water's
Edge-Floodplains and Wetlands, 13 Nat. Resources Law. 351, 364 (1980) (16,000
communities enrolled in program).
149. See J. Clark, The Rise of a New Federalism passim (1938).
150. See, e.g., National Flood Insurance Program, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4128 (1976
& Supp. V 1981) (grants of subsidized flood insurance conditioned on state adoption
of land-use controls consistent with national standards); id. §§ 4012(c), 4022; Exten-
sion of An Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, ch. 640, sec. 4, § 12(b), 54
Stat. 767, 768 (1940) (witholding federal money if state does not fire employee found
guilty of violating federal prohibition on pernicious political activities) (amending An
Act to Prevent Pernicious Political Activities, ch. 410, 53 Stat 1147 (1939)).
151. L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 5-22, at 309 (1978); see Herbers,
What Shape For the New Federalism?, N.Y. Times, March 29, 1981, at 4E, col. 1.
152. See Herbers, supra note 151, at 4E, col 1.
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law. Yet there must be limits on such conditions if the political
values of federalism are to be preserved despite this fiscal centrali-
zation. 153
President Reagan has made a "new federalism" proposal a corner-
stone of his Administration. In his State of the Union message on
January 25, 1983, the President stated that his federalism proposal
was intended "to restore to states and local governments their roles as
dynamic laboratories of change in a creative society.'15 4 The Reagan
proposal has two principal parts. First, it involves the restoration to
the states of the responsibility for important programs undertaken in
recent years by the federal government, including those providing aid
to families with dependent children and food stamps to the needy.155
The second is to replace "categorical" federal grants to the states with
"block grants," under which funds are returned to the states with
minimal conditions. 15 The block grants are made for general pro-
grams such as community development, law enforcement, and em-
ployment and manpower training. As long as states spend the money
for the general programs involved, they are free to use the funds
subject to a minimum number of stipulations. 57
The adoption of President Reagan's "new federalism" proposals,
however, would not revive dual federalism. Turning over programs
and funds to the states would hardly be enough to reestablish the
states as equals to the federal government in the American federal
system. Neither National League of Cities nor the advent of Reagan's
"new federalism" has substantially altered the trend toward federal
predominance. The 1982 Supreme Court decision in FERC v. Missis-
sippi 58 confirms this point. The Court, as previously discussed,159
considered the constitutionality of PURPA. 160 Under PURPA, states
that have agencies regulating electric utilities are required to conduct
153. Linde, Justice Douglas on Freedom in the Welfare State: Constitutional
Rights in the Public Sector, 39 Wash. L. Rev. 4, 28 (1964) (footnote omitted).
154. N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1983, at A14, col 5.
155. Reagan Modifies 'New Federalism'Plan, N.Y. Times, Jan. 26, 1983, at A17,
col. 1.
156. Id. at A17, col. 2. Categorical grants are made for specific narrow purposes
under conditions specified in the grants.
157. Id. at A17, col. 2. The Reagan version of "new federalism," however, has
encountered substantial resistance from three sources. Congress has been reluctant to
give up the control that has accompanied most categorical grants. The ultimate
recipients of such grants believe they need federal protection to ensure that the
federal funds will be spent properly. Finally, the states have not been receptive to the
Reagan proposals because of the difficulty in raising sufficient funds to finance the
programs, such as food stamps, now operated by the federal government. See Her-
bers, supra note 151, at 4E, col. 1.
158. 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
159. See supra notes 38-48 and accompanying text.
160. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3201-3211; 16 U.S.C. §§ 824a-3, 2601-2645 (1982).
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administrative proceedings to consider and determine whether federal
standards should be adopted and enforced with respect to each regu-
lated electric utility. 16 1 Traditionally, states have retained the power
to make decisions and set policy. 112 This includes the power to decide
which proposals are worthy of consideration, the order in which they
should be considered, and the form in which they should be consid-
ered. 16 3 PURPA, however, forces state agencies to consider the na-
tional standards, and deprives states of their discretion over how and
when to debate these standards. It sets the agenda of state agencies,
not agencies of the national government.164
Nonetheless, the Court upheld the statute and rejected the claim
that it violated the tenth amendment or the principle of National
League of Cities.165 If a state were to abandon utility regulation or
abolish its regulatory agency, the state would no longer be forced to
consider the federal standards for regulation of electric and gas utili-
ties. 166 Thus, the statutory requirements do not impose invalid com-
mands upon the states. This, however, leaves states with only a Hob-
son's choice: either to regulate utilities and agree to implement the
federal law, or to abandon utility regulation.16 7
In upholding the statute the Court permitted "the Federal Govern-
ment . . . to use state regulatory machinery to advance federal
goals."'16 The Court acknowledged that the authority to make funda-
mental decisions is an essential attribute of state sovereignty. 169 In this
case, however, the state is not able to consider and promulgate regula-
tions of its choosing, but must instead consider the federal standards.
The agenda to be considered by state decision-makers is set by federal
fiat. Justice O'Connor, dissenting in part in FERC, suggested that the
decision transforms the state legislatures and administrative agencies
into "field offices of the national bureaucracy.' 70
CONCLUSION
Judicial decisions and congressional action since 1976 inexorably
lead to the conclusion that National League of Cities v. Usery has not
161. 16 U.S.C. § 2621 (1982); cf. 15 U.S.C. § 3203 (1982) (states that regulate
natural gas utilities are obligated to conduct hearings to determine the applicability
of federal standards).
162. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982).
163. See id. at 778-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
164. See id. at 748-49, 769.
165. Id. at 769-71.
166. Id. at 766.
167. See La Pierre, supra note 120, at 946.
168. 456 U.S. at 759.
169. Id. at 761 ("Indeed, having the power to make decisions and to set policy is
what gives the State its sovereign nature.").
170. Id. at 777 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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significantly shifted the balance in the federal system toward the
states.'' 1 Despite the fears expressed by commentators and political
pressures from President Reagan's "new federalism" proposal, Na-
tional League of Cities has not provided a vehicle for the revival of
dual federalism in the American system.
In his dissent in National League of Cities, Justice Stevens asserted:
The Court holds that the Federal Government may not interfere
with a sovereign State's inherent right to pay a substandard wage to
the janitor at the state capitol. The principle on which the holding
rests is difficult to perceive.
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to act
impartially when it hires or fires the janitor, to withhold taxes from
his paycheck, to observe safety regulations when he is performing
his job, to forbid him from burning too much soft coal in the
capitol furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an adjacent
waterway, from overloading a state-owned garbage truck, or from
driving either the truck or the Governor's limousine over 55 miles
an hour. Even though these and many other activities of the capitol
janitor are activities of the State qua State, I have no doubt that
they are subject to federal regulation. 1'72
National League of Cities does not invalidate these federal regula-
tions. Cases since National League of Cities have upheld such regula-
tions either because they involve federal protection of civil rights or
the environment, federal spending power, or federal interests that far
outweigh any competing state interest.
Thus, National League of Cities has not turned back the constitu-
tional clock to the days of dual federalism. Even after National
League of Cities, the states and the federal government do not con-
front each other as equals. The federal government may impose its
will without direct regulation under the commerce clause. One may
agree with the National League of Cities effort to preserve the states as
independent governments, free from federal control in their integral
operations. Nonetheless, one Supreme Court decision is not enough to
hold back the onrushing flood of federal power.
171. See, e.g., EEOC v. Wyoming, 103 S. Ct. 1054 (1983); FERC v. Mississippi,
456 U.S. 742 (1982); United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678
(1982); Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981);
New Hampshire Dep't of Employment See. v. Marshall, 616 F.2d 240 (1st Cir.),
appeal dismissed, 449 U.S. 806 (1980); North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano,
445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977), aff'd mei., 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
172. 426 U.S. at 880-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
